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Abstract
Existing research indicates that different dimensions of the design of international institutions
are interrelated. In particular, deep agreements have been shown to be more flexible. We
make two contributions to this literature. On the one hand, we argue and empirically show
that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs). On the other hand, we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom
about depth and flexibility going hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship
between depth and flexibility is weaker for democracies than for non-democracies. Second,
when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the
additional flexibility provisions. An original dataset on the design of 587 PTAs allows us to
test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theo-
retical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international
institutions and the causes and consequences of PTAs.
Key Words: depth, flexibility, institutional design, international institutions, preferential
trade agreements.
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Introduction
Existing research on the design of international institutions shows that deep agreements tend
to be more flexible than shallow ones (Downs et al. 1996; Rosendorff and Milner 2001;
Kucik and Reinhardt 2008). We argue that this pattern also holds for preferential trade
agreements (PTAs). Deep PTAs with many commitments, such as liberalizing services trade
and protecting foreign direct investments and intellectual property rights, should also feature
multiple flexibility measures that allow states to temporarily withdraw concessions. We also
argue, however, that the relationship between depth and flexibility is more nuanced than
existing scholarship recognizes. In particular, the positive relationship between depth and
flexibility should be less pronounced for democracies than for non-democracies. Moreover,
we expect countries to attach strings to the use of the flexibility provisions that they add to
deep agreements.
We test these expectations on a new dataset on the design of 587 PTAs signed between
1945 and 2009 (Du¨r et al. 2014). Our dataset is very comprehensive both in terms of
agreements covered and detail of the coding. It contains data on a substantially larger number
of PTAs than existing datasets. Moreover, it includes a large number of items that allow us
to measure the agreements’ depth and flexibility, and the extent to which the use of flexibility
tools is restricted. Relying on this dataset, we find support for our theoretical expectations.
The findings are highly robust to changes in estimation method and the operationalization
of variables.
We thus provide the first large-n study of the relationship between depth and flexibility
with respect to PTAs. In focusing on PTAs, our study nicely complements the existing
literature on the design of international economic institutions that so far has mainly focused
on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its forerunner the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) (Rosendorff 2005; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt
2008; Pelc 2009). What sets PTAs apart from the GATT/WTO system is that in the
latter, negotiations take place against the background of a more or less fixed institutional
1
structure, which in most cases leaves few elements up for discussion. In negotiating a PTA,
by contrast, countries make many choices regarding institutional design at the same time.
Applying the argument to the case of PTAs is also particularly attractive because evidence is
accumulating that variation in PTA design matters for key economic outcomes such as trade
flows and foreign direct investments.2
While we develop and test our argument for the case of PTAs, we also make a contri-
bution to the broader literature on the design of international institutions (Koremenos et
al. 2001). In particular, our study suggests that there are good reasons to believe that
the depth-flexibility relationship is more nuanced than currently recognized also for interna-
tional institutions other than PTAs. Both the argument about regime type and the concept
of flexibility strings should travel to other institutional settings. We develop these broader
implications of our article in the conclusion.
The Relationship between Depth and Flexibility in PTAs
International agreements vary both in terms of depth of cooperation and flexibility. Depth
can be understood as the extent to which an agreement constrains state behavior.3 In
the particular case of trade agreements, deep agreements liberalize trade more than shallow
agreements. An important determinant of the depth of a trade agreement is average tariff cuts
states are asked to undertake. Trade agreements, however, can also contribute to liberalizing
trade relations between states by opening some services sectors to foreign competition or
by allowing foreign companies to bid for tenders for government procurement contracts.
Similarly, the protection of foreign direct investment can substantially enhance market access
for exporters, as foreign investments can be a precondition for trade. A trade agreement can
also go beyond protecting investments against arbitrary decisions and explicitly liberalize
2For the effect of trade agreement design on trade flows, see Du¨r et al. 2014 and Egger and Nigai 2015;
and for foreign direct investments, see Bu¨the and Milner 2014.
3This is similar to Downs et al. (1996, 383) who define depth as “the extent to which [an agreement]
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence”.
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foreign investments (World Trade Organization 2011).
Other behind-the-border obstacles that a deep trade agreement may remove are bur-
densome technical standards, sanitary or phytosanitary measures, inadequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and competition rules that discriminate against foreign traders.
Some PTAs, for example, foresee the mutual recognition of international product standards
or the harmonization of technical regulations (Piermartini and Budetta 2009). This reduces
transaction costs and increases market integration. The strengthening of intellectual prop-
erty rights is also important for enabling exporters to pursue a long-term market penetration
strategy. Absence of patent or trademark protection directly translates into less exports
and less technology transfer in the case of investments directed at foreign markets (Maskus
and Penubarti 1995). Finally, cooperation on competition policy is important to address
unfair business behavior by state enterprises and private firms. Competition provisions thus
facilitate exports and foreign investments. The depth of a trade agreement, therefore, is a
function of tariff cuts and provisions concerning services, government procurement, invest-
ments, standards, intellectual property rights and competition.
Flexibility provisions are devices included in an agreement that allow states to antici-
pate and respond to domestic contingencies or to adjust their policies for other purposes
without violating the terms of an agreement. They provide for legally accepted opt-outs
without leading to a de jure breach of an agreement and encompass exit options, duration
and renegotiation clauses, reservations, escape clauses, and withdrawal clauses (see, for ex-
ample, Koremenos et al. 2001; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Helfer 2005; Koremenos 2005;
Neumayer 2007; Helfer 2013).
Special and general safeguard provisions, anti-dumping clauses, balance of payments
(BoP) exceptions, and tariff overhang (namely a gap between applied and bound tariffs)
are flexibility instruments that can often be found in trade agreements. The Treaty of Rome
(1957), for example, allowed member states of the European Economic Community to sus-
pend part of their liberalization in the case of BoP difficulties (Art. 109). Similarly, the
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EU–South Korea PTA contains a special safeguard related to cars (Elsig and Dupont 2012).
In addition, safety valves exist to address anti-competitive behavior by other states (excessive
use of subsidies to boost exports) or by firms (dumping practices). These exist in the form
of anti-dumping and countervailing duty provisions.
While depth and flexibility capture two distinct dimensions of institutional design, several
studies have argued and/or shown that depth and flexibility are positively related (Rosendorff
and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008; Johns 2014). Two different causal pathways may
explain this relationship. The first explanation is that flexibility may facilitate the negotiation
of deeper agreements (Kucik and Reinhardt 2008). The argument is based on the assumption
that states value the long-term benefits of cooperation, but also face short-term domestic
pressure to violate an agreement, which varies over time. When the pressure is strong,
governments have an incentive to violate agreements that do not contain flexibility provisions
(Downs et al. 1996). Violation, in turn, may prompt retaliation, causing a breakdown of
cooperation. States, therefore, only negotiate deep agreements if they can include flexibility
in the agreement that ensures the long-term viability of cooperation.
Alternatively, deep agreements may lead to greater domestic demand for flexibility. The
starting point of this argument is that international agreements have distributional effects.
In the case of trade, agreements benefit exporters that gain from better foreign market access
and multinational companies that (plan to) invest in partner countries. At the same time,
they hurt import-competing interests that face greater import competition. Importantly, a
trade agreement’s distributional effects depend on its depth. Recent research shows that
deeper agreements have a greater positive trade flow effect than shallow ones (Baier and
Bergstrand 2007; Du¨r et al. 2014; Egger and Nigai 2015). They also encourage more foreign
direct investments (Bu¨the and Milner 2014).
Given these distributional effects, deep agreements can be expected to receive support
from exporters and multinational companies. At the same time, plans for a deep agreement
should lead to particularly intensive lobbying from import-competing groups that demand
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protection. The reason is that the number of economic sectors that potentially experience
negative effects from a PTA increases together with the depth of an agreement. Service
providers, for example, do not have to fear foreign competition if an agreement only lib-
eralizes trade in goods. Similarly, sectors protected via discriminatory technical standards
do not need to bother about tariff cuts, unless the trade agreement also includes a pro-
vision that harmonizes technical standards. If import-competitors are unable to block an
agreement, they will push for a minimum objective, namely ensuring that the agreement is
highly flexible. For them, flexibility provisions soften the impact of an agreement and serve
as a form of protection (Grossman and Helpman 1994). In the face of strong lobbying by
import-competitors, governments can be expected to make deep agreements flexible.
Both causal arguments thus lead to the expectation that depth and flexibility are posi-
tively related. So far, this relationship between depth and flexibility has mainly been tested
for the case of trade agreements negotiated in the framework of the GATT/WTO. Kucik and
Reinhardt (2008), for example, show that countries that have an anti-dumping instrument
agree to lower tariff bindings upon entry into the GATT/WTO system (and sustain them as
members) than other countries. In PTAs, we expect the causal mechanism to work in the
other direction. PTA negotiators tend to resolve the question of depth first, and only then
decide on the amount of flexibility included in the agreement. In fact, as soon as countries
signal their intention to negotiate a PTA, they specify how ambitious the future agreement
should be, long before specific flexibility provisions are negotiated. The causal link thus most
probably goes from depth to flexibility. As in the empirical analysis below we do not test
for the causal direction, we remain agnostic about the direction and simply posit a positive
relationship between depth and flexibility:
Hypothesis 1 The deeper a PTA, the more flexible it is.
For two reasons, we expect that the conventional wisdom that motivates Hypothesis 1
needs to be qualified. First, the relationship between depth and flexibility is conditional on
regime type, because democracies rely more strongly on non-tariff barriers and trade remedies
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for protection than non-democracies (Kono 2006). The reason is that in democracies, voters
punish politicians that impose high tariffs, which is a transparent tax on consumers. So that
they still can satisfy interest groups that demand protection, democratic governments rely
on devices about which voters have little information, namely non-tariff barriers and trade
remedies.
For the design of PTAs, this “optimal obfuscation” argument implies that democracies
will include flexibility provisions even in shallow agreements, as they need them to respond to
protectionist demands in a manner that avoids punishment by voters. In the absence of flex-
ibility, they would be in breach of the agreement when, for example, imposing anti-dumping
or countervailing duties. Non-democracies, by contrast, see little advantage from flexibility in
shallow agreements. By definition, a shallow agreement does not hinder them selectively to
use trade barriers to placate import competitors; and they do not need flexibility provisions
for that purpose as they have no incentive to disguise their reliance on protectionism for
reasons related to voters’ concerns.
As depth increases, we expect to see only a small increase in flexibility for democracies,
which already include much flexibility in shallow agreements. The causal argument presented
above about the relationship between depth and flexibility thus should mainly apply to non-
democracies. They see their ability to respond to protectionist demands via traditional trade
barriers restricted in deep agreements; and then add flexibility provisions to deep agreements
that satisfy import-competing interests. Table 1 summarizes this argument. Importantly,
we only expect the relationship between depth and flexibility to be conditional on regime
type for flexibility measures that relate to non-tariff barriers. For flexibility measures related
to tariffs (such as tariff cut phase-ins, as discussed below), we do not expect such a con-
ditional relationship. Even if democracies are less likely to rely on tariffs for protectionist
purposes, they have little to gain from a very rapid reduction of existing tariff rates. We thus
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 The positive relationship between depth and flexibility is weaker for democ-
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Table 1: Regime type, depth and flexibility.
Shallow Deep
Democracies
Need flexibility to respond
to protectionist demands
Need flexibility to respond
to protectionist demands
Non-democracies
Less need for flexibility;
protectionist demands are satisfied
with other trade barriers
Need for flexibility,
as ability to use other
measures constrained
racies than for non-democracies.
Second, when governments add more flexibility to deep agreements, they are likely to
attach strings to the use of these additional flexibility provisions. The causal logic underlying
this qualification starts with the insight that flexibility poses risks for both governments and
exporters alike. Countries may use flexibility to ease adjustment costs and thus reduce
temporarily high costs of compliance. As this ensures the long-term viability of cooperation,
this is the intended use of flexibility. Some countries, however, may abuse flexibility provisions
that offer them some discretion to impose temporary trade barriers with the aim of giving
rents to particular domestic constituencies. Overuse of the opt-outs, in turn, jeopardizes
the overall benefits of the agreement (and its stability) in the long run. It may even nullify
the benefits of market access. Exporters that value market access thus oppose lax rules on
flexibility which would allow foreign governments or importers to demand too much protection
(Kucik 2012, 98).
With the aim of avoiding abuse of flexibility provisions with a discretionary element,
governments then have a strong incentive ex-ante to define limits to the use of flexibility
instruments. They can be expected to agree on procedural constraints to control the ap-
plication of escape tools as a sort of hand-tying approach. Various possibilities exist for
restricting the use of flexibility measures. In terms of safeguards and anti-dumping, states
may limit the duration of an anti-dumping duty, restrict the upper level of the trade remedy
imposed, or make reference to the GATT/WTO legal framework that prescribes a number
of procedural and substantive obligations that shield against abuse. In the case of the South
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Korea–US negotiations, for example, the Korean car industry lobbied hard for changes in US
trade remedy laws that would make the imposition of anti-dumping duties more difficult. As
regards subsidies, treaties may push governments to decrease or eliminate them or demand
active cooperation among authorities to address competition-related negative spill-overs. For
instance the trade agreement between Japan and Switzerland foresees that while parties to
the agreement can maintain high levels of domestic support, no export subsidies shall be
introduced or maintained on agricultural products for which tariff liberalization has been
agreed.4 We call these measures “flexibility strings”.
The second qualification of the conventional wisdom that we derive from this reasoning
is that countries will attach strings to the use of flexibility provisions. Governments will seek
an optimal degree of flexibility that allows for temporary breach and adaptation if necessary,
but that is restricted through a set of tools. We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 PTAs that are more flexible contain more flexibility strings.
Before empirically examining our hypotheses, we address two potential objections to our
argument. On the one hand, some evidence suggests that governments do not start from
scratch in designing PTAs, but rely on templates. Even if they do so, however, this should
not affect our analysis, as the PTA template is likely to include all of the aspects of the
design of a PTA that we capture in our hypotheses: depth, flexibility and flexibility strings.
To the extent that copying takes place, we expect governments to copy provisions from all
three areas, meaning that the postulated relationships should remain intact.
On the other hand, our discussion so far has ignored the fact that two or more countries
contribute to the design of a PTA. In a highly asymmetric relationship, the larger country
(e.g. the US) may not bother about including flexibility provisions into a formally deep
agreement, if the smaller country (e.g. Oman) does not pose a threat for its import-competing
sectors. The smaller country, in turn, may not have the power to insist on the inclusion of
4In the WTO, export subsidies in agricultural products are generally still allowed under specific condi-
tions. The abolition of these subsidies is part of the single negotiation package in the context of the current
negotiations in the framework of the WTO.
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the flexibility provisions or to resist the imposition of flexibility strings. In such a case, the
postulated relationships between depth, flexibility and flexibility strings would disappear.
Our expectation, however, is that import-competitors in a large country are concerned that
the agreement could set a precedent, and thus defend the inclusion of flexibility provisions
even in agreements with smaller trading partners. Although we think that power asymmetry
should not affect our results, below we carry out an empirical test that directly tackles this
issue.
Operationalization and Descriptive Evidence
For the empirical analysis of the relationship between depth, flexibility and flexibility strings,
we rely on an original dataset on the design of 587 PTAs signed between 1945 and 2009. The
list of agreements contains 358 bilateral and 229 plurilateral agreements, and substantially
goes beyond the list of agreements registered with the WTO (60 percent of them feature in
the WTO list). It is the result of the integration of several existing lists (including those
maintained by the Organization of American States’ Foreign Trade Information System and
the World Bank) and the systematic search of government web pages. The average agreement
in the dataset is relatively young (no fewer than 73 percent of the agreements have been signed
since 1990); was signed by developing countries (67 percent are of a South–South type); and
is a full free trade agreement (60 percent of the dataset).
The agreements were manually coded for a total of eight market-access related sectors
of cooperation that may be included in PTAs, encompassing goods, services, investments,
intellectual property rights, competition, public procurement, standards, and trade remedies.
For each of these sectors, a significant number of items were coded, meaning that we have
about 100 data points for each agreement. To ensure the reliability of the data, all agreements
were double-coded, and any differences between the two sets of data were then resolved.5
For nearly all variables, inter-rater agreement as measured by Cohen’s kappa is higher
5For more details, see Du¨r et al. 2013.
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than 0.75. Moreover, cross-checks of the dataset against existing ones that partially overlap
with it confirm the reliability of the data.6 The large number of agreements coded and the
level of detail included in the coding mean that this dataset offers a unique opportunity to
test our argument. In the following, we discuss how we use this dataset to measure depth,
flexibility and flexibility strings.
We use two different measures of depth below. On the one hand, we created an additive
index of 48 items in our dataset (Depth (index)). We only included items in the index that
theoretically are related to depth and weighted each item equally (the appendix contains a
list of all of these items). While theoretically this measure can range from 0 to 48, in practice
we observe values in the range from 0 to 40. On the other hand, we relied on item response
analysis on the same set of variables to arrive at a measure of depth (Depth (IR)). Latent
trait analysis is a technique that is similar to factor analysis, with the advantage that it is
applicable to binary data (Bartholomew et al. 2011). The specific model that we apply,
which is known as the Rasch model, assumes that all items capture one underlying latent
dimension. The items, however, contribute more or less to this latent dimension (that is, they
have more or less discriminatory power). Using this operationalization, provisions that are
relatively rare contribute more to depth than provisions that are ubiquitous. After rescaling
to remove negative values, this variable ranges from 0 to 3.3.
The two measures are highly correlated (r=0.94). For both depth measures, we find that
over time agreements have become deeper, with the trend towards deep agreements starting in
the second half of the 1980s. We also observe that North-South agreements are substantially
deeper than both North-North and South-South agreements in our dataset. North–North
agreements are only slightly deeper than South–South agreements. The deepest agreements
in the dataset are signed by the United States (for example, Australia–US and Colombia–
US), Japan (for example, Japan–Switzerland) and the European Free Trade Association
6For these other datasets, see the contributions in Estevadeordal et al. 2009, World Trade Organization
2011 and Kucik 2012. Estevadeordal et al. 2009 includes up to 70 agreements that also feature in the
present dataset (varying depending on chapter). World Trade Organization 2011 analyzes the contents of 96
agreements. Kucik 2012 coded 323 of the agreements contained in our dataset.
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(for example, European Free Trade Association–Colombia). On both measures of depth,
147 agreements score 0, including the African Common Market and a large number of Arab
agreements. As these examples suggest, in contrast to Slapin and Gray (2014), in our dataset
depth and the number of member states are not positively related.
We also rely on two measures of flexibility. On the one hand, we use a simple additive
index of the presence or absence of four provisions in PTAs: a provision allowing for the
suspension of tariff cuts in the case of balance of payments problems, a general safeguard
provision, a provision allowing for the imposition of countervailing duties, and a provision
allowing for the imposition of anti-dumping duties (Escape flexibility).7 In the absence of
these provisions, a country that suspends its tariff cuts or imposes antidumping and counter-
vailing duties for goods covered by the agreement is in breach of the agreement.8 These four
provisions thus serve as escape clauses. The index can range from 0 to 4. In our dataset,
73 agreements score 0 and 260 agreements score 4 on this variable. Over time, we see an
increasing number of agreements including several of these escape provisions.
On the other hand, PTAs may also introduce flexibility by allowing member states to
postpone tariff reductions (Chase 2003). The more time states have to achieve the agreed
tariff cuts, the more flexibility exists for import-competing groups to adjust to increased
competition. We thus use the maximum (across all tariff categories) number of years that
countries are given to achieve the liberalization of tariffs envisaged in the agreement as a
second measure of flexibility (Transitional flexibility). Phase-out periods for tariff liberal-
ization range between 0 years (all tariffs are liberalized at the date of entry into force of
an agreement) and 25 years. We took the median for the member countries of a PTA if
the transition periods vary across countries.9 As this type of flexibility does not contain a
7We also used item response analysis as described for depth above to combine these four items into a
weighted index. The resulting variable is highly positively correlated with the additive index that we use
(rs = 0.90).
8If an agreement is silent on the use of trade remedies, parties have a legitimate expectation that these
mechanisms are not used, as they run counter to the main objective of an international agreement that
foresees trade liberalization through tariff cuts.
9This is the case for 20 percent of agreements. If we take the mean or the minimum value in these cases,
we obtain similar results (available upon request).
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discretionary element, it does not require flexibility strings.
Following Hypothesis 1, flexibility should be positively related to depth. To examine
this proposition, we show boxplots for Escape flexibility based on a recoded depth variable
that ranges from 0 (very shallow) to 4 (very deep). The resulting graph (Figure 1) shows a
strong positive relationship between the two variables. It also suggests that the relationship
may not be linear, an issue that we take up below. In Figure 2, we show that the positive
relationship between depth and flexibility also holds for our second measure of flexibility
(Transitional flexibility). Again, we see a positive relationship between the two variables. As
depth increases, transitional flexibility also increases. The figure shows that US agreements
are not only deep, but several of them also feature very long transition periods. By contrast,
the African Economic Community (1991) is a stark outlier in the sense that it is very shallow
and has one of the longest transition periods in the dataset.
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Figure 1: Depth versus escape flexibility.
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Figure 2: Depth versus transitional flexibility.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the relationship between depth and flexibility is conditional on
regime type (Regime). We rely on the Polity IV dataset to distinguish between democracies
and non-democracies.10 In line with the existing literature, we consider countries to be
democracies if they have a Polity score of 6 or higher (Marshall et al. 2010; Poast and
Urpelainen 2013).11 We use the smallest of the Polity scores for all members as the value
for the PTA, but we get the same results if we use the mean. Of the 587 agreements in
our dataset, 285 (48.6 percent) were signed by democracies (we have missing values for
11 agreements). In a bivariate analysis, we find support for the conjecture put forward
in Hypothesis 2. The mean value of Escape flexibility for shallow agreements (a value of
10Results do not change if we use other measures of democracy such as that of Cheibub et al. 2010.
11Our results are not sensitive to this particular threshold. We obtain similar results, which are available
upon request, if we use 7 or 8 as the threshold.
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Depth (index) of 10 or less) is 2.88 for democracies and only 1.95 for non-democracies. For
deep agreements, the value increases to 3.57 for democracies and to 3.64 for non-democracies.
Moving from a shallow to a deep agreement hence matters much more for non-democracies
than for democracies.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 refers to constraints on flexibility. We operationalize this variable
(Flexibility strings) using six items that capture limits with respect to the imposition of
antidumping duties, the provision of subsidies, and the use of the safeguard provisions.12
These capture provisions that impose WTO rules on the use of the antidumping instrument,
the safeguard provision and the provision of subsidies, stipulate that the safeguard provision
is only valid during the transition period, create a common policy on subsidies, and define
a minimum dumping margin (the appendix contains more information on these items). The
variable potentially ranges from 0 to 6, depending on the number of provisions included in a
trade agreement that restrict the imposition of antidumping duties and the use of subsidies
and the safeguard provisions. In practice, the variable ranges from 0 (195 agreements) to 5
(4 agreements).13
Figure 3 offers a first test of our argument concerning a relationship between flexibility and
flexibility strings. The relationship between the two variables is positive as expected following
Hypothesis 3. As escape flexibility increases, countries make its use more difficult. The
relationship is slightly non-linear, however: at the maximum of escape flexibility, flexibility
strings are less pronounced than when escape flexibility takes the value of three. As can be
seen in the Appendix (Figure A-4), this non-linearity is driven by a decline in the number
of WTO restrictions on safeguard provisions in highly flexible agreements. This drop is due
to European agreements that de facto contain the same strings attached to the use of the
safeguard clauses as the WTO, but without making an explicit reference to the WTO. We
address the issue of non-linearity in the robustness checks below.
12This variable partly overlaps with Kucik’s (2012) operationalization of “rigidity”. We also consider rules
concerning subsidies, however, and use references to WTO rules as a short-cut to many of the constraints
included in Kucik’s measure.
13Again, this variable is highly correlated with one that relies on Item Response Analysis (rs = 0.99).
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Figure 3: Escape flexibility versus flexibility strings.
Revisiting the Relationship between Depth and Flexi-
bility
Going beyond the descriptive evidence, we estimate multivariate regression models with
flexibility and flexibility strings as dependent variables. For two reasons, we choose the PTA
as the unit of analysis and thus consciously depart from previous PTA research that mainly
used dyad-year (Mansfield and Milner 2012) or PTA-country-year (Kucik 2012) as unit of
analysis. First, the design of a PTA does not vary across member countries in our dataset.
By using dyad-year or PTA-country-year as units of analysis, therefore, we would multiply
the values of our dependent variable in plurilateral agreements. Second, with the exception
of a small number of regional agreements (in particular, the European Union), the design of
PTAs does not vary over time in our dataset. By dropping the time dimension, therefore, we
do not lose any information. In fact, using the PTA as the unit of analysis is a conservative
choice to avoid inflating the number of observations and artificially reducing standard errors.
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Control Variables
In the following multivariate models, we include several control variables that allow us to
deal with potentially confounding factors. Since our unit of analysis is the PTA, we take the
minimum value of each continuous variable across member countries to capture the weakest
link.14 In terms of economic variables, we use total GDP (GDP ) and GDP per capita
(GDPpc) to capture the economic importance and income level of a country. Countries with
relatively large markets and relatively rich countries may find it easier to design more rigid
agreements. Moreover, we include the minimum value of trade flows (imports plus exports)
among PTA members (Trade). Here, the effect could go both ways: more trade may mean
that countries have an incentive to design more rigid agreements; but it could also mean that
such PTAs have larger distributional effects, meaning that countries require more flexibility.
As is common practice in the empirical trade literature, we take the log of this value.
We also add a variable that captures whether a country has recently undergone a transition
from autocracy to democracy (Democratization). The expectation is that democratizing
countries require more flexibility (and fewer strings) since they face high levels of uncertainty
about future states of the world. This variable scores one if all member countries of a PTA
have transitioned to democracy over the past ten years, with Polity IV as indicator.
We also add a dummy that scores one if all PTA members are also members of the
WTO (WTO). WTO members tend to implement trade policies that differ from those of
countries that are not members (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). They also have discretionary
flexibility provisions upon which they can rely. The expectation thus is for WTO members
to design more rigid agreements. Finally, we include the number of member countries of
a PTA (No.Members), which has been hypothesized to be positively related to flexibility
(Koremenos et al. 2001). Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dependent and
independent variables.
14Our results are similar if we use the median or average across member countries. Results are available
upon request.
16
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Escape flexibility 2.68 1.46 0 4
Transitional flexibility 3.44 5.04 0 25
Flexibility strings 1.53 1.35 0 5
Depth 8.13 10.03 0 40
GDP 21.30 1.81 14.13 27.39
GDPpc 8.41 0.99 5.07 10.64
Trade 2.96 2.70 0 11.98
Regime 1.55 7.14 -10 10
Regime dummy 0.49 0.50 0 1
Democratization 0.25 0.43 0 1
WTO 0.50 0.50 0 1
No. members 5.65 8.65 2 91
Statistical Models
Since Escape flexibility and Flexibility strings are ordinal variables, we use ordered probit to
estimate the models that include them as dependent variables.15 We rely on zero-inflated
negative binomial regression in the equations that have Transitional flexibility as dependent
variable, since this is a count variable with a large number of zeros (about 50 percent of our
observations score zero).16 This estimation technique predicts first the existence of excess
zeros using a logistic regression and then predicts the number of years until the end of the
transition period using a negative binomial estimation. We include the same variables in the
first and second stages.
Findings
Table 3 shows the results of the baseline models. In models 1 and 2, we test Hypothesis
1 for both of our measures of flexibility. In model 3, we add an interaction term between
depth and regime type to test Hypothesis 2. Models 4 and 5, finally, have Flexibility strings
15Results, available upon request, are similar if we use multinomial logistic regression.
16The test of α shows that a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a zero-inflated poisson
model (except for Model A16). The Vuong test shows that a zero-inflated negative binomial model is preferred
to an ordinary negative binomial regression.
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as dependent variable, allowing us to test Hypothesis 3. In the latter two models, we keep
Depth as control variable, to make sure that our results are not driven by the distinction
between detailed and less detailed agreements. In Model 5, we drop PTAs that have a value
of zero on Escape flexibility, since we cannot expect states to include flexibility strings in
agreements with no discretionary flexibility.
Across all models, the findings are in line with our expectations.17 Indeed, the coeffi-
cients of both Depth and Escape Flexibility are positive and statistically significant at the
conventional level.18 Thus, deeper PTA are more flexible. Similarly, more escape flexibility
goes hand in hand with a greater number of flexibility strings, even after controlling for the
depth of a PTA (Model 4). This latter finding is robust to dropping PTAs with no escape
flexibility (Model 5).
To assess whether the relationship between depth and flexibility is conditional on regime
type, figures 4 and 5 show the marginal effect of non-democracy and democracy on Escape
flexibility for different values of Depth. We focus on the probability of including no flexibility
provisions (Figure 4) and including the maximum number of escape clauses (Figure 5). The
figures show, first, that for a given level of Depth, democracies tend to sign more flexible PTAs
than non-democracies. Second, and in line with our second hypothesis, the effect of Depth
on flexibility is larger for non-democracies than for democracies. Figure 4 shows that as
Depth increases, the probability of including no flexibility into PTAs decreases substantially
more for non-democracies than for democracies. Similarly, Figure 5 shows that as Depth
increases, the probability of making a PTA highly flexible increases substantially more for
non-democracies than for democracies (when moving from 0 to 20, we see an increase of 40%
for non-democracies and 20% for democracies). The positive correlation between depth and
flexibility is thus contingent on domestic institutions, as presented in Table 1.
17In all models, we lose some observations because some of our control variables have incomplete coverage.
Our results are not sensitive to dropping control variables with missing observations.
18For model 2, we only show the coefficients of the second equation. In the first equation, as expected,
Depth and Trade are negative predictors of the probability of having zero tariff transition. The other variables
are not statistically significant.
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Table 3: Baseline models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariates Escape Transitional Escape Strings Strings
Depth 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Escape flexibility 0.71*** 0.73***
(0.05) (0.06)
Regime 0.04*** 0.01* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01)
Regime dummy 0.77***
(0.14)
Depth × Regime -0.04***
(0.01)
GDP -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.17*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
GDPpc 0.06 -0.17*** 0.05 -0.04 0.002
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade -0.07** 0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05** -0.06**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Democratization -0.07 -0.21** -0.06 -0.28** -0.30***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
WTO 0.04 -0.10 0.04 0.40*** 0.44***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
No. members -0.0005 -0.01 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cut1 -0.96 -0.83 4.86*** 5.14***
(0.89) (0.88) (0.99) (1.03)
Cut2 -0.42 -0.29 5.71*** 6.00***
(0.89) (0.88) (1.00) (1.04)
Cut3 0.09 0.22 6.70*** 7.02***
(0.88) (0.88) (1.01) (1.05)
Cut4 0.61 0.74 8.32*** 8.63***
(0.89) (0.88) (1.02) (1.07)
Cut5 9.60*** 9.91***
(1.04) (1.09)
Constant 4.17***
(0.71)
Test of α 61.38***
Vuong test 9.04***
Nonzero Obs. 208
Zero Obs. 263
Observations 559 471 559 543 482
Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 are ordered probit. Model 3 is a zero-inflated negative binomial model.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 4: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling zero for
democracy and autocracy.
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Figure 5: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling four for
democracy and autocracy.
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Table 4: Predictions for the effect of Depth on Escape flexibility (Model 1).
Value Min → Max CI
0 -0.16 [-0.20, -0.12]
1 -0.16 [-0.19, -0.12]
2 -0.17 [-0.22, -0.13]
3 -0.14 [-0.18, -0.10]
4 0.63 [0.52, 0.71]
Table 5: Predictions for the effect of Escape flexibility on Flexibility strings (Model 4).
Value Min → Max CI
0 -0.83 [-0.89, -0.75]
1 0.06 [0.01, 0.10]
2 0.34 [0.28, 0.39]
3 0.40 [0.34, 0.45]
4 0.04 [0.02, 0.06]
5 0.002 [0.0002, 0.01]
In Table 4, we summarize the magnitude of the substantive effects of Model 1. Moving
Depth from its minimum to its maximum value increases by 63 [52, 71] percent the probability
of having the highest value of Escape Flexibility, that is, four. The results of Model 2 indicate
that moving Depth from its minimum to its maximum value increases the tariff transition
period by 8 [6, 10] years. The transition period increases by 3 [2, 4] years if Depth moves
from a standard deviation below the mean to a standard deviation above the mean.
In Table 5, we summarize the magnitude of the substantive effects of Model 4. Moving
Escape Flexibility from its minimum to its maximum value decreases by 83 [-89, -75] percent
the probability of having the lowest value of Flexibility Strings, that is, zero. Similarly,
moving Escape Flexibility from its minimum to its maximum value increases by 40 [34, 45]
percent the probability of observing a value of 3 on Flexibility Strings.19
The results for the control variables also are largely in line with our expectations. Large
19In our dataset, very few PTAs have values that are equal to 4 or 5.
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countries sign agreements that contain more flexibility strings. Rich countries have shorter
transition periods than poor ones. Equally, democratization is negatively correlated and
WTO membership is positively correlated with the number of flexibility strings. Of the
coefficients that are statistically significant, only the negative sign for the coefficient for
Democratization in model 2 is surprising. Contrary to our expectation, democratizing coun-
tries sign agreements with a shorter transition period. The reason here may be that these
countries use PTAs as a commitment device, and thus want these agreements to take effect
as soon as possible (Liu and Ornelas 2014). As expected, the effect of Trade on flexibility
is ambiguous. Paired with the descriptive evidence provided above, these models thus offer
encouraging support for our hypotheses.
Robustness Checks
We perform several tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, we replace the indica-
tors of depth, escape flexibility, and flexibility strings obtained by summing provisions with
the indicators of depth, escape flexibility, and flexibility strings that rely on item response
analysis (see the discussion above). Doing so does not change our results (see Table A1 in
the supplementary file available on ScholarOne). Second, Figures 1 and 3 indicate that the
relationships between the relevant variables may be non-linear. To address this issue, we
recode Depth so that it scores one for values between one and five, two for values between
six and ten, and so on. Then, we include each value as a dummy on the right-hand side of a
model (leaving Depth=0 as baseline) in which Escape Flexibility is the dependent variable.
The model does indeed offer some evidence of non-linearity (Table A2). The effect of very
high values of Depth, namely between 36 and 40, is lower than that of values of Depth
between 31 and 35 (the difference is statistically significant with p<0.1). Nevertheless, and
importantly, the effect of very deep agreements remains positive, as expected in Hypothesis
1. Similarly, we include dummies of each value of Escape Flexibility in a model in which
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Flexibility Strings is the dependent variable. The results show that the positive effect of
Escape Flexibility on Flexibility Strings is larger when Escape Flexibility is equal to three
than when it is equal to two (the difference is statistically significant at p<0.01). Again,
however, the model confirms our key expectation of a positive relationship between Escape
Flexibility and Flexibility Strings. We also exclude these PTAs that have a value of zero in
our Depth variable (147 observations in our dataset). Even in this case, the main results
remain unchanged (see models A8, A9, and A10 in the supplementary file).
Third, as suggested above, power asymmetry could affect the relationship between depth,
flexibility, and flexibility strings. If a large country such as the US does not fear competition
from a small country, import-competitors in the former only have weak incentives to lobby
for the inclusion of flexibility provisions in a PTA. At the same time, the large country
could impose flexibility strings on the small country. To test this counter-argument, we split
our sample into North–South PTAs, and North–North and South–South PTAs. Should the
aforementioned objection hold, Depth should not be statistically significant in the sub-sample
of North–South PTAs. Table A3 (in the supplementary file), however, shows that this is not
the case. Depth remains positive and statistically significant in these models. In fact, there
is no statistically significant difference between the coefficients in the two sub-samples.
Fourth, we use Kucik’s (2012) data to operationalize Escape flexibility and Flexibility
strings and re-run our main models. The operationalization of Escape flexibility is the same
as we use above; to measure Flexibility strings, we rely on Kucik’s (2012) measure of rigidity.20
Table A4 and Figures A11 and A12 in the supplementary file show that our main results
hold even using this different dataset, which includes only half the number of observations
that we have in our dataset.
Finally, we include a variable counting the years since the signing of the first PTA in
our dataset, that is, since 1948. This variable accounts for the possibility that a time trend
could drive our results, as both flexibility and depth increase over time. It allays concerns
20Since this measure of Flexibility strings ranges from 0 to 15, we estimate the model relying on ordinary
least squares regression. The results are similar if we use an ordered probit model.
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that a third variable, not included in our model, which also increases over time, causes the
growth in both depth and flexibility that we capture. Table A5, however, shows that our
main results are unchanged even after including this trend variable.21
Conclusion
Based on an original dataset on the design of 587 PTAs, we have found that two qualifica-
tions apply to the conventional understanding of the depth-flexibility nexus in the design of
international institutions. On the one hand, while on average deep trade agreements tend
to be more flexible than shallow ones, this relationship is less pronounced for democracies
than for non-democracies. Our explanation for this is that democracies rely more heavily
on non-tariff barriers and other forms of contingent protection, such as trade remedies, than
autocracies (Kono 2006). On the other hand, while deep PTAs contain more flexibility, states
restrict the additional, discretionary flexibility with flexibility strings.
Our findings contribute in several important ways to the literature on the design of in-
ternational institutions (e.g. Koremenos et al. 2001). First, our finding that the relationship
between depth and flexibility is moderated by members’ regime type shows that the de-
terminants of institutional design are more complex than was recognized in earlier work.
Domestic institutions play an important, but so far over-looked, role in conditioning the re-
lationship between different dimensions of the design of international treaties. Second, the
concept of flexibility strings that we introduce illustrates how governments can deal with
time-inconsistency problems. Governments have strong incentives to ensure that flexibility
does not threaten the stability of deep agreements. Flexibility strings allow countries to
maintain predictability even when engaging in deep cooperation. Finally, we add an analysis
of PTAs to the literature on the design of international institutions that so far has mainly
focused on a few prominent international organizations (but see Baccini 2010; Kucik 2012).
21The results are similar if we include the square and cube of the time-trend variable (Carter and Signorino
2010). Since the three variables are highly correlated (ρ > .95), we prefer to include only one time-trend
variable.
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Our empirical focus has the advantage that in the negotiations for PTAs, all aspects of design
are up for discussion. This makes PTAs a particularly interesting case for an analysis of how
different dimensions of design are interrelated.
We also speak to the broader literature on PTAs (Manger 2009; Baccini and Du¨r 2012;
Mansfield and Milner 2012). Whereas for some time the quantitative PTA literature treated
all PTAs as equal, more recently authors have started to pay attention to how diverse such
agreements are in terms of design. Explaining this variation should help better identify the
reasons for signing PTAs, as states’ motivations to form PTAs may also affect the design
of PTAs. Our findings regarding the relationship between depth and flexibility should also
make future research on the consequences of PTAs cautious about testing the effects of one
of these two dimensions without also considering the other.
Future research could look in more detail at which aspects of depth are correlated with
greater flexibility. While we have used aggregate measures of depth and flexibility, our dataset
allows for a more fine-grained analysis of this relationship. A further extension of our work
would be to see whether our findings hold for agreements other than PTAs. We formulated
the argument about why the depth–flexibility relationship is moderated by regime type with
specific reference to the trade field. Nevertheless, democracy may also create complexity
in other policy areas (Kono 2006); a similar conditional effect could then be expected for
environmental or security agreements. Such research would shed further light on our finding
that the relationship between depth and flexibility is more nuanced than might be expected
based on the prevailing scholarship.
References
Baccini, Leonardo. 2010. Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The
Role of Transparency and Flexibility. European Union Politics 11(2): 195-217.
Baccini, Leonardo and Andreas Du¨r. 2012. The new regionalism and policy interdependence.
25
British Journal of Political Science 42(1):57–79.
Baier, Scott L. and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. 2007. Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase
Members’ International Trade? Journal of International Economics 71(1):72–95.
Bartholomew, David J., Martin Knott, and Irini Moustaki. 2011. Latent Variable Models
and Factor Analysis: A Unified Approach. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
Bu¨the, Tim and Helen V. Milner. 2014. Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements and
Foreign Direct Investment: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Devel-
oping World, 1970-2007. World Politics 66(1):88–122.
Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case
of NAFTA. International Organization 57(1):137–174.
Cheibub, Jose A., Jennifer Gandhi and James R. Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and Dictator-
ship Revisited. Public Choice 143(1-2):67–101.
Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. Back to the Future: Modeling Time
Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis 18(3):271–292.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News about
Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50(3):379–406.
Du¨r, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini and Manfred Elsig. 2014. The Design of International
Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Database. Review of International Organizations
9(3):353–375.
Egger, Peter and Sergey Nigai. 2015. Effects of Deep versus Shallow Trade Agreements
in General Equilibrium. In Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of
Preferential Trade Agreements, edited by Andreas Du¨r and Manfred Elsig. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Elsig, Manfred and Ce´dric Dupont. 2012. European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic
Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of New Trade Agreements. Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies 50(3):492–507.
Estevadeordal, Antoni, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh, eds. 2009. Regional Rules in the
26
Global Trading System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. The American
Economic Review 84(4):833–850.
Haftel, Yoram Z. 2013. Commerce and Institutions: Trade, Scope, and the Design of Regional
Economic Organizations. Review of International Organizations 8(3):389–414.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2005. Exiting Treaties. Virginia Law Journal 91(7):1579–1648.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2013. Flexibility in International Agreements. In Interdisciplinary Per-
spectives on International Law and International Relations, edited by Jeffrey Dunoff and
Mark Pollack, 175–196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johns, Leslie. 2014. Depth versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(3):468–495.
Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.
American Political Science Review 100(3):369–84.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Polit-
ical Science Review 99(4):549–565.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of
International Institutions. International Organization 55(4):761–799.
Kucik, Jeffrey. 2012. The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences
over Trade Agreement Rules. Economics & Politics 24(2):95–118.
Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Appli-
cation to the Global Trade Regime. International Organization 62(3):477–505.
Liu, Xuepeng and Emanuel Ornelas. 2014. Free trade agreements and the consolidation of
democracy. Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6(2):29–70.
Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 2012. Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy
of International Trade Agreements. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mansfield, Edward D. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism:
The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements.
27
International Organization 57(4):829–862.
Maskus, Keith E. and Mohan Penubarti. 1995. How Trade-Related Are Intellectual Property
Rights? Journal of International Economics 39(3):227–248.
Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2009. Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade
Agreements. International Studies Quarterly 53(2):349–368.
Piermartini, Roberta and Michele Budetta. 2009. A Mapping of Regional Rules on Technical
Barriers to Trade. In Bank Regional Rules in the Global Trading System, edited by
Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh,250–315. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Procedure. American Political Science Review 99(3):389–400.
Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization 54(4):829–857.
Slapin, Jonathan B., and Julia Gray. 2014. Depth, Ambition and Width in Regional Eco-
nomic Organizations. Journal of European Public Policy 21(5):730–45.
World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators.
World Trade Organization. 2011. World Trade Report – The WTO and Preferential Trade
Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
28
Supplementary file
This is the supplementary file for Baccini, Du¨r and Elsig (2014) The Politics of Trade Agree-
ment Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus, International Studies Quarterly.
Operationalizing depth
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lTRIM reference
Common competition authority
National competition authority
TBT harmonization
Pharmaceuticals in IPRs
Mergers
WIPO Phonograms Treaty
WIPO copyright treaty
SPS harmonization
Geographic indications
IPR substantive standards
Procurement transparency
Procurement national treatment
Competition coordination
Movement of natural persons (investments)Rome Convention
Procurement chapter
Investments MFN
Non−distorting standards
Services MFN
Negative list approach
Standards of treatment
Movement of natural persons
Acquisitions
Pre−establishment operation
Post−establishment operation
Bern Convention
Investments national treatment
Establishment
Paris Convention
Transfers and payments
Investment chapter
Services non−establishment
Competition chapter
International standards
IPR MFN
Procurement WTO
Services national treatment
TRIPS
SPS Cooperation
GATS reference
SPS WTO
TBT WTO
Service continuous
TBT Cooperation
IPR general
Monopoly
Service chapter
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent of agreements
Pr
ov
is
io
n
Figure A-1: The items included in Depth.
Services
[Service chapter] Does the agreement contain a reference to the liberalization of trade in
services?
[GATS reference] Does the agreement contain a reference to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS)?
[MFN treatment] Does the agreement contain an MFN clause for services?
[Negative list approach] Does the agreement foresee a negative list approach to services
liberalization?
1
[Services national treatment] Does the agreement contain a national treatment clause
for services?
[Services non-establishment] Does the agreement grant the right of non-establishment
for service provision (that is, does it allow the provision of services without local presence)?
[Movement of natural persons] Does the agreement allow the movement of natural per-
sons in the provision of services?
[Service continuous] Does the agreement contain a review provision for the services pro-
visions?
Investments
[Investment chapter] Does the agreement contain substantive investment provisions?
[Standards of treatment] Does the agreement contain provisions that grant compensation
to investors in case of strife and/or expropriation?
[TRIM reference] Does the agreement contain a reference to the WTO agreement on
trade-related investment measures?
[Pre-establishment operation] Does the agreement contain non-discrimination provisions
in relation to pre-establishment operations?
[Establishment] Does the agreement contain non-discrimination provisions in relation to
establishment (e.g. greenfield investments)?
[Post-establishment operation] Does the agreement contain non-discrimination provi-
sions in relation to post-establishment operation (e.g. the free movement of capital and
resale)?
[Mergers] Does the agreement contain non-discrimination provisions in relation to acquisi-
tion (e.g. mergers)?
[Investments MFN] Does the agreement grant MFN treatment on investments?
[Investments national treatment] Does the agreement grant national treatment on in-
vestments?
[Transfers and payments] Does the agreement mention specific restrictions regarding
transfers and payments?
[Movement of natural persons (investments)] Does the agreement mention restrictions
related to the temporary movement of business or natural persons?
Intellectual Property Rights
[IPR general] Does the treaty contain a provision on intellectual property rights (IPRs)?
[IPR MFN] Does the treaty contain an MFN provision for IPRs?
[Rome Convention] Does the treaty contain specific deadlines for acceding to the Rome
Convention?
[Paris Convention] Does the treaty contain specific deadlines for acceding to the Paris
Convention?
[Bern Convention] Does the agreement contain specific deadlines for acceding to the Bern
Convention?
[TRIPS] Does the agreement mention the TRIPS agreement?
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[WIPO Copyright Treaty] Does the agreement contain specific deadlines for acceding to
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaty?
[WIPO Phonograms Treaty] Does the agreement contain specific deadlines for acceding
to the WIPO Phonograms treaty?
[IPR substantive standards] Does the agreement contain specific provisions in relation
to substantive standards of protection?
[Pharmaceuticals in IPRs] Does the agreement contain references to pharmaceuticals?
[Geographic indications] Does the agreement contain references to geographical indica-
tions?
Public Procurement
[Procurement chapter] Does the agreement contain substantive provisions on public pro-
curement?
[Procurement national treatment] Does the agreement guarantee national treatment
with respect to public procurement?
[Procurement transparency] Does the chapter on public procurement include a trans-
parency provision?
[Procurement WTO] Does the agreement contain a reference to the WTO/GATT pro-
curement agreements?
Technical Barriers to Trade
[TBT WTO] Does the agreement contain a reference to the WTO Agreement on technical
barriers to trade (TBTs) (the GATT standards code)?
[TBT cooperation] Does the agreement call for cooperation and/or information exchange
on TBTs?
[Non-distorting standards] Does the agreement contain a requirement for standards to
be least trade-distorting?
[International standards] Does the agreement encourage the use of international stan-
dards?
[SPS cooperation] Does the agreement contain provisions calling for information exchange
and technical cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures?
[SPS WTO] Does the agreement contain a reference to the WTO SPS agreement?
[TBT harmonization] Does the agreement contain provisions that stipulate the harmo-
nization of standards?
[SPS harmonization] Does the agreement contain provisions that stipulate the harmoniza-
tion of SPS provisions?
Competition
[Competition chapter] Does the agreement contain a competition chapter?
[National competition authority] Does the agreement contain a provision stipulating the
establishment of a national competition authority?
[Competition coordination] Does the agreement contain a provision stipulating coordi-
nation among national authorities?
3
[Common competition authority] Does the agreement contain a provision stipulating
the creation of a common authority/institution on competition?
[Monopoly] Does the agreement contain a provision on monopolies and cartels?
[Acquisitions] Does the agreement contain a provision on mergers and acquisitions?
4
Operationalizing escape flexibility and flexibility strings
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Figure A-2: The items included in Escape flexibility and Flexibility strings.
Escape flexibility
[AD allowed:] Does the agreement allow anti-dumping with specific provisions?
[CV allowed:] Does the agreement mention the use of countervailing duties?
[Safeguard:] Does the agreement foresee special safeguard provisions?
[BOP provision:] Does the agreement include BOP provisions?
Flexibility strings
[WTO restriction AD:] Does the agreement make a reference to GATT/WTO anti-
dumping provisions?
[WTO restriction subsidy:] Does the agreement make a reference to GATT/WTO subsidy
provisions?
[WTO restriction safeguard:] Does the agreement make a reference to GATT/WTO
safeguard provisions?
[Common policy on subsidies:] Does the agreement foresee a common policy of parties
on subsidies?
[Safeguard only in transition period:] Does the agreement allow parties to use safeguard
measures only during the transition period?
[De minimis dumping margin:] Does the agreement foresee a de minimis dumping margin
(or dumped volume) that differs from the GATT/WTO?
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Figure A-3: Depth and the items included in Escape flexibility.
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Figure A-4: Escape flexibility and the items included in Flexibility strings.
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Results from robustness checks
Table A-1: Models with variables operationalized using item response analysis (Models A1,
A3, and A5 are OLS regressions. Models A2 and A4 are ZINB.).
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
VARIABLES EscapeFlexibilityFA TransitionalFlex EscapeFlexibilityFA TransitionalFlex FlexibilityStringsFA
DepthFA 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.36*** 0.13** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
EscapeFlexibilityFA 0.27***
(0.03)
Regime Dummy 0.28*** 0.02
(0.06) (0.11)
Regime Dummy * DepthFA -0.14** 0.11
(0.06) (0.08)
GDP -0.04* -0.06 -0.05* -0.07* 0.06***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
GDPpc 0.07** -0.18*** 0.08** -0.13** -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Trade -0.04*** 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Regime 0.02*** 0.01* -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GATTWTO -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.18***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05)
NoMembers -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Democratization 0.04 -0.26** 0.05 -0.22** -0.16***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05)
Constant 0.28 4.40*** 0.25 4.22*** -1.08***
(0.47) (0.74) (0.47) (0.74) (0.37)
Alpha -1.86*** -1.86***
(0.20) (0.20)
Vuong 8.84*** 8.61***
Non zero obs. 208 208
Zero obs. 263 263
Observations 565 471 565 471 565
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.61
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-2: Non-linearity and dropping shallow PTAs.
(A6) (A7) (A8) (A9) (A10)
Variables Escape Flexibility Flexibility String Escape Flexibility Escape Flexibility TransitionalFlex
1.Depth 1.00***
(0.13)
2.Depth 1.91***
(0.17)
3.Depth 2.25***
(0.23)
4.Depth 1.86***
(0.31)
5.Depth 1.32***
(0.30)
6.Depth 1.84***
(0.27)
7.Depth 2.02***
(0.30)
8.Depth 1.33***
(0.35)
Depth 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
1.EscapeFlexibility 0.53
(0.33)
2.EscapeFlexibility 1.19***
(0.31)
3.EscapeFlexibility 2.56***
(0.31)
4.EscapeFlexibility 2.77***
(0.30)
Regime Dummy 0.82***
(0.19)
Regime Dummy * Depth -0.04***
(0.01)
GDP 0.02 0.16*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
GDPpc 0.07 -0.04 0.14* 0.11 -0.14**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Trade -0.05* -0.06** -0.05* -0.05* 0.06***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Regime 0.03*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GATTWTO -0.03 0.36*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11)
NoMembers -0.004 0.0004 -0.01 -0.01** 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratization -0.30** -0.26* -0.30** -0.28* -0.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
cut1 0.27 4.76*** -1.07 -0.97
(0.92) (1.02) (1.12) (1.11)
cut2 0.89 5.64*** -0.64 -0.55
(0.92) (1.03) (1.12) (1.11)
cut3 1.51 6.65*** -0.13 -0.02
(0.92) (1.03) (1.12) (1.11)
cut4 2.11** 8.25*** 0.53 0.64
(0.92) (1.05) (1.12) (1.11)
cut5 9.52***
(1.07)
Constant 3.87***
(0.79)
Alpha -0.30**
Vuong 8.38***
Non zero obs. 178
Zero obs. 169
Observations 559 543 422 422 347
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-3: Power asymmetry.
(A11) (A12) (A13) (A14) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18)
N-N&S-S PTAs N-S PTAs N-N&S-S PTAs N-S PTAs N-N&S-S PTAs N-S PTAs N-N&S-S PTAs N-S PTAs
Variables EscapeFlexibility EscapeFlexibility EscapeFlexibility EscapeFlexibility TransitionalFlex TransitionalFlex FlexibilityStrings FlexibilityStrings
Depth 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.22*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
EscapeFlexibility 0.69*** 0.76***
(0.06) (0.13)
Regime Dummy 1.02*** 0.47
(0.17) (0.37)
Regime Dumy * Depth -0.18*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
GDP -0.09* 0.18* -0.13** 0.19* 0.04 -0.19*** 0.07 0.42***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10)
GDPpc 0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.16** -0.12** -0.04 0.08
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.14)
Trade 0.003 -0.21*** 0.0003 -0.22*** 0.02 0.09*** -0.01 -0.13***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
GATTWTO 0.06 0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.27** 0.45*** 0.32
(0.13) (0.26) (0.13) (0.26) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23)
NoMembers -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Democratization -0.04 0.13 0.00 0.10 -0.23* 0.07 -0.42*** 0.84
(0.13) (0.72) (0.13) (0.73) (0.12) (0.24) (0.15) (0.63)
Regime 0.04*** 0.03* 0.02 0.02** -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cut1 -2.27** 1.02 -2.27** 1.48 2.69** 11.21***
(1.01) (2.32) (1.01) (2.33) (1.18) (2.23)
cut2 -1.77* 2.16 -1.74* 2.64 3.46*** 12.42***
(1.01) (2.30) (1.01) (2.32) (1.18) (2.26)
cut3 -1.26 2.75 -1.19 3.22 4.52*** 13.36***
(1.00) (2.31) (1.01) (2.32) (1.19) (2.29)
cut4 -0.74 3.36 -0.64 3.83 6.26*** 15.00***
(1.00) (2.31) (1.01) (2.33) (1.20) (2.34)
cut5 7.68*** 16.26***
(1.24) (2.36)
Constant 2.13*** 6.78***
(1.00) (2.34)
Alpha -1.86***
(0.24)
Vuong 7.63*** 6.64***
Non zero obs. 147 66
Zero obs. 206 73
Observations 413 146 413 146 353 139 397 146
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-4: Relying on data from Kucik (2012).
(A19) (A20) (A21) (A22)
Ordered Probit Ordered Probit OLS OLS
VARIABLES EscapeFlexibility (Kucik) EscapeFlexibility (Kucik) FlexibilityString (Kucik) FlexibilityString (Kucik)
Depth 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
EscapeFlexibility (Kucik) 3.07*** 3.60***
(0.13) (0.17)
Regime Dummy 1.07***
(0.25)
Regime Dummy * Depth -0.03
(0.02)
GDP 0.01 -0.02 0.26** 0.22*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
GDPpc -0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.22
(0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18)
Trade -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
GATTWTO 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.42 0.42
(0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.29)
NoMembers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Democratization -0.18 -0.15 -0.81*** -0.87***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.30)
Regime 0.06*** -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
cut1 -1.11 -1.49
(1.43) (1.45)
cut2 -0.53 -0.91
(1.43) (1.44)
cut3 0.04 -0.32
(1.43) (1.44)
cut4 1.86 1.52
(1.43) (1.44)
Constant -7.97*** -9.16***
(2.34) (2.47)
Observations 272 272 271 250
R-squared 0.86 0.83
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-5: Including a time trend variable.
(A23) (A24) (A25) (A26) (A27)
VARIABLES Escape Flexibility Transitional Flex Escape Flexibility Transitional Flex FlexibilityString
Depth 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EscapeFlexibility 0.70***
(0.06)
Regime Dummy 0.67*** -0.25
(0.14) (0.19)
Regime Dummy * Depth -0.03*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
GDP -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
GDPpc 0.10 -0.18*** 0.10 -0.17*** 0.13
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Trade -0.06** 0.06*** -0.06** 0.06*** -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
GATTWTO 0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.48***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
NoMembers 0.0004 0.01 -0.003 0.01 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratization -0.15 -0.18* -0.13 -0.17 -0.43***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14)
Regime 0.04*** 0.01** 0.02* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time Trend 0.02*** -0.01** 0.02*** -0.01** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
cut1 -0.39 -0.30 6.64***
(0.90) (0.89) (1.07)
cut2 0.17 0.26 7.58***
(0.90) (0.89) (1.08)
cut3 0.69 0.79 8.72***
(0.90) (0.89) (1.09)
cut4 1.23 1.32 10.37***
(0.90) (0.89) (1.11)
cut5 11.62***
(1.13)
Constant -2.02*** -2.04***
(0.21) (0.22)
Observations 559 471 559 471 482
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A-5: The effect of DepthFA on Escape flexibility FA for democracy and autocracy
(Model A1).
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Figure A-6: N-N & S-S: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling
zero for democracy and autocracy (Model A3).
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Figure A-7: N-N & S-S: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling
four for democracy and autocracy (Model A3).
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Figure A-8: N-S: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling zero
for democracy and autocracy (Model A3).
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Figure A-9: N-S: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility equalling four
for democracy and autocracy (Model A3).
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Figure A-10: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility (Kucik) equalling
zero for democracy and autocracy (Model A4).
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Figure A-11: The effect of Depth on the probability of Escape flexibility (Kucik) equalling
four for democracy and autocracy (Model A4).
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